United Nations S/2007/207

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 April 2007

Original: English

Letter dated 13 April 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to consultations I had with members of the Security Council on 5 April 2007, following my trip to the Middle East region. As you will recall, one of the issues we discussed at that meeting was a proposal contained in paragraph 64 of my report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2007/147). I had suggested that, in considering further steps to ensure the full implementation of paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006), including the arms embargo, the Security Council might wish to support an independent assessment mission to monitor the border.

As you will also recall, one question raised by some members of the Council was with regard to the position of the Government of Lebanon vis-à-vis this proposal. I am pleased to inform you that, during a telephone conversation that I had with Prime Minister Siniora yesterday, he welcomed the idea and agreed in principle to the mission. We also agreed that, if the Council supports the proposal, the United Nations would cooperate closely with the Government of Lebanon on the terms of reference of such a mission.

I would like the mission envisaged in paragraph 64 of my report to provide recommendations on measures and strategies leading to the enhancement of border security along Lebanon's border with the Syrian Arab Republic. This would build on the work of earlier United Nations and bilateral missions. I would also like to clarify that the proposal entails sending a small team, with specific terms of reference and for a limited period of time, to fully assess the monitoring of the whole border.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

07-30800 (E) 160407

United Nations A/61/859–S/2007/208

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
16 April 2007

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-first session
Agenda item 19
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-second year

Letter dated 12 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 12 April 2007, addressed to you by Kemal Gökeri, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Baki **İlkin**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

07-30849 (E) 180407

Annex to the letter dated 12 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 21 February 2007, addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/61/757-S/2007/102), which yet again contains well-known allegations about the presence of Turkish troops on the island, and to bring to your kind attention the following:

In the face of unfounded allegations and distortions contained in the aforementioned letter, I feel compelled, once again, to set the record straight, by reminding the Greek Cypriot representative that the only "occupation" in Cyprus is the 43-year-old usurpation and continued occupation by the Greek Cypriot side of the seat of government of the bicommunal partnership Republic of Cyprus established under the 1960 treaties.

The Greek Cypriot representative fails to recall that it was the Greek Cypriot armed onslaught in December 1963 against the Turkish Cypriot people and the bicommunal partnership order that led to the division on the island. There is no mention of the systematic campaign of atrocities, which was perpetrated against the Turkish Cypriot people until 1974, when Turkey acted in accordance with her rights and obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee in the wake of a bloody coup d'etat by Greece and its collaborators in Cyprus. Turkey's presence as a Guarantor Power in Northern Cyprus, especially in the absence of a settlement, is vital for the security of the Turkish Cypriot people. This is evidenced by the fact that the Turkish military presence, as a deterrent against Greek-Greek Cypriot aggression, has preserved peace and stability in the island during the past 32 years.

It should be emphasized that, had the latest comprehensive settlement plan (Annan Plan) been accepted by the Greek Cypriot side, except for the symbolic number envisaged in the Plan, the Turkish as well as Greek troops would have left and the total disarmament of the island would have taken effect.

The allegation by the Greek Cypriot representative on the legality of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus deserves also clarification. Suffice it to say that the Greek Cypriot regime or its representatives have no right to question the legality of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which was established through the free and democratic will of the Turkish Cypriot people, and over which they have no right of say whatsoever.

By levelling unfounded accusations against Turkey, as being the "aggressor", the Greek Cypriot side is in fact trying to disguise the years of torment they inflicted upon the Turkish Cypriot people and conceal their rearmament frenzy. Ever since the inception of the Joint Military Doctrine with Greece in 1993, the Greek Cypriot administration has undertaken an unprecedented build-up of arms and armed forces, the latest of which is the recruitment of some 1,000 Greek mercenaries from mainland Greece to the Greek Cypriot National Guard. Together with 80,000 Greek Cypriot reservists, each of whom keeps a gun and ammunition at their homes, the cumulative number of Greek-Greek Cypriot armed personnel amounts approximately to a total of 100,000 in the island.

I would like to emphasize that the continuing militarization campaign by the Greek Cypriot side, as well as the hostile and restrictive policies directed against the Turkish Cypriot people, constitute the underlying causes of tension and mistrust in Cyprus. My Government expects that the Greek Cypriot side will be urged by the international community to abandon its anachronistic policies against the Turkish Cypriot people and to stop the arming campaign, which exacerbate tension and hinder progress towards reconciliation between the two sides.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) M. Kemal **Gökeri**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations A/61/860–S/2007/209

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
16 April 2007
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-first session
Agenda item 13
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-second year

Identical letters dated 16 April 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On the instructions of my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical table of Israeli violations between 1 and 7 April 2007 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 13, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Caroline **Ziade**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

07-30883 (E) 180407 190407

Annex to the identical letters dated 16 April 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Information summary

Re: Israeli violations, acts of aggression and activities from 1 to 7 April 2007, inclusive

Air violations

On 3 April 2007, at 1405 hours, an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the eastern sector of the South and circled over Tallat al-Hamamis. At 1430 hours, military aircraft overflew al-Naqurah at high altitude.

On 4 April 2007, between 0835 hours and 1400 hours, a reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace over the western Bekaa in a north-easterly direction as far as Rayyaq and circled overhead. It then left Lebanese airspace over the town of Rashaya.

Between 0820 hours and 1225 hours, a reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace over the sea off Tyre in an easterly direction and circled over the South. It then left Lebanese airspace over the sea off Tyre.

On 7 April 2007, between 2058 hours and 2340 hours, a reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace over the sea off Sarafand in a north-easterly direction as far as Beirut, and then returned in a southerly direction and circled between Sarafand and Beirut. It then left Lebanese airspace over al-Naqurah.

Sea violations

On 4 April 2007, at 1515 hours, an enemy Israeli military launch fired several bursts of medium-machine-gun fire in the open sea off Ras al-Naqurah.

On 7 April 2007, at 0459 hours, an enemy Israeli military launch fired a flare bomb in the open sea off Ras al-Naqurah.

Field violations

On 6 April 2007, at 1900 hours, four enemy Israeli forces personnel were seen in the Lebanese part of the town of Ghajar, which overlooks the al-Wazzani bridge. They departed after five minutes.

On 7 April 2007, between 1330 hours and 1400 hours, enemy Israeli forces fired several bursts of medium-machine-gun fire from their position in Ruwaysat al-`Alam (inside the occupied Shab`a farmlands) in the direction of Birkat al-Naqqar.

Israeli activities

On 4 April 2007, at 0845 hours, the enemy army discharged light-weapons fire in Qafwah farm inside the occupied Shab`a farmlands. At 1300 hours, it discharged similar fire in the area around its position east of Markaba.

United Nations S/2007/210

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 April 2007

Original: English

Letter dated 16 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to write to transmit to you the proposal of the Frente Polisario for a mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dumisani S. **Kumalo**
Ambassador and Permanent Representative
of the Republic of South Africa

07-30876 (E) 170407

Annex to the letter dated 16 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English and French]

Proposal of the Frente Polisario for a mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara

I. The Conflict of Western Sahara is a decolonisation question:

1. Included since 1965 on the list of the Non-Self-Governing territories of the UN Decolonisation Committee, Western Sahara is a territory of which the decolonisation process has been interrupted by the Moroccan invasion and occupation of 1975 and which is based on the implementation of the General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) regarding the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

2. The UN General Assembly and the Security Council have identified this conflict as a decolonisation conflict between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO whose settlement passes by the exercise by the Saharawi people of their right to self-determination.

3. Likewise, the International Court of Justice, at the request of the General Assembly has clearly ruled, in a legal opinion dated 16 October 1975, that "the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory".

4. Furthermore, on 29 January 2002, at the request by the Security Council, the UN Legal Counsel clearly established that Morocco was not the administering power of the territory, that the Madrid Agreement of 1975 dividing the territory between Morocco and Mauritania did not transfer any sovereignty to its signatories and, finally, that the status of Western Sahara, as Non-Self-Governing Territory, had not been affected by this agreement.

II. The solution of the conflict passes by the holding of a referendum on self-determination:

5. The question of Western Sahara having been identified by the International Community as a decolonisation question, the efforts aiming to settle it have consequently and naturally been guided by the objective of offering the people of this territory the opportunity to decide their future through a free and fair referendum on self-determination.

6. The Settlement Plan approved by the two parties to the conflict, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, and by the Security Council in its resolutions 658 (1990) and 690 (1991), complemented by the Houston Agreements

negotiated and signed in September 1997 by the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, under the auspices of James Baker III, Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General, and endorsed by the Security Council as well as the Peace Plan for Self-determination for the People of Western Sahara or Baker Plan approved by the Security Council in its resolution 1495 (2003), all provide for the holding of a referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara.

All these efforts failed because of the reneging of the Kingdom of Morocco on its international commitments.

III. Readiness of the Frente POLISARIO to negotiate with a view to holding the referendum on self-determination and the granting of post-referendum guarantees to Morocco and to Moroccan residents in Western Sahara:

7. The Frente POLISARIO that unilaterally declared a cease-fire which it has ever since respected scrupulously, and that accepted and implemented in good faith the Settlement Plan by virtue of which the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was deployed as well as the Houston Agreements, and that has honoured all the commitments it has undertaken by making concessions sometimes painful in order to offer to the Saharawi people the opportunity to freely decide their destiny, reiterates solemnly its acceptance of Baker Plan and declares its readiness to negotiate directly with the Kingdom of Morocco, under the auspices of the United Nations, the modalities for implementing it as well as those relating to the holding of a genuine referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara in strict conformity with the spirit and letter of the UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and within the format envisaged in the framework of Baker Plan, namely the choice between independence, integration into the Kingdom of Morocco and self-governance.

8. The Frente POLISARIO is also committed to accepting the results of the referendum whatever they are and to already negotiate with the Kingdom of Morocco, under the auspices of the United Nations, the guarantees that it is prepared to grant to the Moroccan population residing in Western Sahara for 10 years as well as to the Kingdom of Morocco in the political, economic and security domains in the event that the referendum on self-determination would lead to independence.

9. The guarantees to be negotiated by the two parties would consist in:

9.1: the mutual recognition of and respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries in accordance with the principle of the intangibility of the borders inherited from the independence period;

9.2: the granting of guarantees concerning the status and the rights and obligations of the Moroccan population in Western Sahara, including its participation in the political, economic and social life of the territory of Western Sahara. In this respect, the Saharawi State could grant the Saharawi nationality to any Moroccan citizen legally established in the territory that would apply for it;

9.3: the agreement on equitable and mutually advantageous arrangements permitting the development and the joint exploitation of the existing natural resources or those that could be discovered during a determined period of time;

9.4: the setting up of formulas of partnership and economic cooperation in different economic, commercial and financial sectors;

9.5: the renunciation by the two parties, on a reciprocal basis, of any compensation for the material destructions that have taken place since the beginning of the conflict in Western Sahara;

9.6: the conclusion of security arrangements with the Kingdom of Morocco as well as with the countries of the region that may be interested;

9.7: the commitment of the Saharawi State to work closely with the Kingdom of Morocco as well as with the other countries of the region with a view to bringing to conclusion the integration process of the Maghreb;

9.8: the readiness of the Saharawi State to participate with Morocco and the countries of the region in the maintenance of peace, stability and security of the whole region in the face of the different threats that could target it.

Likewise, the Saharawi State would positively consider any request from the United Nations and the African Union to participate in peace-keeping operations.

10. The Frente POLISARIO is ready, under the auspices of the United Nations and with the approval and the support of the Security Council, to enter in direct negotiations with the Kingdom of Morocco on the basis of the aforementioned parameters with a view to reaching a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations mainly the General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), thus bringing about peace, stability and prosperity for the whole region of the Maghreb.

United Nations S/2007/211

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 April 2007

Original: English

Letter dated 16 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Group of 77 and China, I have the honour to write to you, in your capacity as President of the Security Council for April, regarding the inclusion in the provisional programme of work of the Council of an open debate pursuant to the letter dated 5 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Council (S/2007/186), which has been scheduled for Tuesday, 17 April 2007, and whose main objective will be exploring the relationship between energy, security and climate.

In this context, the Group of 77 and China wishes to offer its views on the decision by the Council to hold a debate on energy, security and climate.

The Council's primary responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security, as set out in the Charter of the United Nations. On the other hand, other issues, including those relating to economic and social development, are assigned by the Charter to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. The ever-increasing encroachment by the Security Council on the roles and responsibilities of other principal organs of the United Nations represents a distortion of the principles and purposes of the Charter, infringes on their authority and compromises the rights of the general membership of the United Nations.

The issues of energy and climate change are vital for sustainable development. Responsibilities in the field of sustainable development belong to the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and their relevant subsidiary bodies, including the Commission on Sustainable Development and the United Nations Environment Programme. Climate change has a binding multilateral agreement, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and a supportive protocol, the Kyoto Protocol to the Convention. No role was envisaged for the Security Council.

We are of the view that it is vital for all Member States to promote sustainable development by adhering to the Rio principles, especially the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, and fully implement Agenda 21 and other commitments related to the provision of financial resources, the transfer of technology and capacity-building of developing countries, undertaken at Rio, Johannesburg and other relevant United Nations conferences in the economic and social fields.

07-30870 (E) 160407

The Group has consistently maintained that the Framework Convention on Climate Change is the appropriate forum for considering the risks associated with climate change and actions needed to address climate change in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Convention. Developed countries should take urgent action to fulfil their commitments to reducing greenhouse emissions in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol. Countries that have not yet done so should accede to the Protocol.

The Group also feels it inappropriate to consider the issue of energy in the Security Council. We reaffirm the key role of energy in achieving the goals of sustainable development and poverty eradication and the Millennium Development Goals. Therefore, we emphasize the critical role of the international community in the provision of adequate, predictable, new and additional financial resources, technology transfer and enhancing capacity-building of the developing countries, as agreed in Agenda 21, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and the decisions of the Commission on Sustainable Development. Also, there is a need for political will and commitment to explore innovative ways of applying energy-efficient, environmentally sound, cost-effective and socially acceptable technologies and systems.

The Group of 77 and China will continue to pursue the realization of the goals of sustainable development, as well as the fulfilment of commitments by developed countries in all relevant bodies, especially at the forthcoming fifteenth session of the Commission on Sustainable Development, and we urge others to do likewise.

We hope that the decision by the Council to hold this debate does not create a precedent or undermine the authority or mandate of the relevant bodies, processes and instruments that already address these issues.

I would like to request that the present letter be circulated as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Munir **Akram**
Chairman of the Group of 77 and China
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations

United Nations S/2007/212

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 April 2007

Original: English

Letter dated 17 April 2007 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

The Security Council welcomes the confirmation in the letter dated 16 April 2007 from the Representative of the Sudan that the Government of the Sudan accepts in full the heavy support package for the African Union Mission in the Sudan proposed by the African Union and the United Nations (see annex).

The Security Council recalls its presidential statement of 19 December 2006 welcoming the commitment of the Government of National Unity in the Sudan to the conclusions of the Addis Ababa high-level consultation on the situation in Darfur and the communiqué of the 66th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The Council reaffirms its endorsement of those agreements, including the immediate deployment of the light support package and heavy support package to the African Union Mission in the Sudan and a hybrid operation in Darfur. The Council further endorses the final report on the African Union/United Nations consultations on the United Nations proposed heavy support package to the African Union Mission in the Sudan of 21 January 2007 and requests that you take all necessary steps to implement the arrangements specified in the report.

The Security Council supports in particular the proposals made in section VI, paragraphs 35 to 41, of your 23 February 2007 report (S/2007/104) on the situation in Darfur, with respect to the heavy support package, and urges their implementation through the use of additional and existing United Nations resources.

The Security Council reaffirms that there is no military solution for the parties to end the crisis in Darfur. The Council endorses the approach in the Addis Ababa conclusions of an immediate ceasefire, reinvigorated political process and deployment of an effective hybrid African Union/United Nations peacekeeping operation in Darfur, including the role envisaged for the tripartite mechanism. The Council welcomes the appointment of the African Union and the United Nations envoys for the Darfur Peace Process and calls for their work to advance with all possible speed and with the cooperation of all relevant groups.

(*Signed*) Emyr **Jones Parry**
President of the Security Council

07-31157 (E) 180407

Annex

Letter dated 16 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

With reference to the high-level technical meeting held in Addis Ababa on 9 April 2007, regarding the heavy support package to the African Union Mission in the Sudan, and the options and clarifications given during that meeting, I am pleased, upon instructions from my Government, to convey to you Sudan's approval of the helicopters component.

It is the sincere hope of the Sudan that implementation of the heavy support package will proceed expeditiously.

(*Signed*) Abdalmahmood **Abdalhaleem**
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2007/213

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 April 2007

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), in which the Council requested that it be kept regularly informed of progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, respect for the ceasefire and implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The report also provides an assessment of the overall situation in the country since my previous progress report to the Council, dated 25 January 2007 (S/2007/42).

II. Implementation of the major elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

2. During the period under review, the parties continued to make some, albeit limited, progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, including welcome steps towards the redeployment of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) from Southern Sudan. However several key issues, including the status of Abyei and the management of other armed groups, remained unresolved. There are increasing concerns about the timeline for elections scheduled for 2009, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the demarcation of the 1 January 1956 border, which remain well behind schedule.

Security aspects

3. At the same time, the security situation in the UNMIS area of operations remained generally stable. The town of Malakal, which was the scene of heavy fighting in November 2006, has been calm but tense. In parts of Upper Nile State and the transitional areas there were several civil disturbances, related mainly to the non-payment of public sector salaries. Looting and ambushes perpetrated by rogue elements continued along arterial roads around Juba. On 26 January 2007, a United Nations peacekeeper was killed in an attack on a humanitarian demining team near Magwit, Eastern Equatoria. Elsewhere in Equatoria, reported activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in March continued to undermine security.

4. Redeployment of the parties' armed forces is at a critical stage. Recently, SAF made visible progress in withdrawing from Southern Sudan, moving troops out of the conflict-prone district of Phom al-Zeraf in Upper Nile State and redeploying an

07-30330 (E) 180407

air defence unit out of the Malakal area. However, to meet the 9 July deadline for their departure from Southern Sudan, SAF still has to complete its redeployment from Malakal and other important locations, including the oil-rich Bentiu area, where it has retained a concentration of forces. Meanwhile, the redeployment of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) from Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States has yet to begin.

5. While both parties have asserted their commitment to meeting the redeployment timelines set out in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the process is under pressure because of lengthy delays in implementing other security arrangements specified in the Agreement. According to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, redeployment targets may be met through the actual movement of forces, the transfer of troops into Joint Integrated Units or demobilization. According to those criteria, SAF has now redeployed 71 per cent of its forces; however, SPLA remains seriously concerned about the number of forces remaining in Southern Sudan, including former militia members now assigned to Joint Integrated Units. SPLA also questions the status of some 7,747 "voluntarily demobilized" soldiers, who continue to receive SAF salaries pending absorption into the much-delayed demobilization and reintegration programme.

6. Although there has been progress in the formation of Joint Integrated Units, delays in this area continue to undermine the fulfilment of the security protocol. SPLA redeployment is contingent upon the establishment of Joint Integrated Units, which so far have reached 77 per cent of their total projected strength, with 30,112 troops assigned out of the anticipated 39,000. In some areas, the two components of the Joint Integrated Units are co-located and have established good working relations, but in others, designated forces remain in their assembly areas some distance from the planned sites. Progress in this area has been especially slow in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, owing partly to the severe logistical problems of SPLA. Overall, SPLA remains suspicious of SAF military intelligence activity within the units, while SAF argues that SPLA should accelerate its own redeployment to keep pace with the formation of Joint Integrated Units.

7. In a significant development, in February the parties agreed on a common military doctrine and code of conduct for the Joint Integrated Units, which the joint operational headquarters in Juba will now translate into practical activity. This offers some hope for the much-needed integration of the units, which to date have remained functionally divided, with each side retaining its own administration and command and control mechanisms.

8. In a related issue, the integration of other armed groups aligned with the parties also remains problematic. A number of groups formerly aligned with SAF have shifted their allegiance to SPLA and remain in Southern Sudan, while others have been absorbed into the SAF component of the Joint Integrated Units. Many are expected to undergo disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the planning for which is progressing slowly. To overcome distrust, the parties must develop a joint strategy for managing other armed groups and for allowing the transparent verification of their numbers, which has so far proved challenging.

9. In sector 6 of UNMIS operations (which includes the disputed area of Abyei), the reporting period saw renewed shifts of allegiance among non-incorporated armed groups in Meiram and Debab. The overall heavy military presence in this area remains a source of concern, particularly as both parties reimposed restrictions

on UNMIS movements on 28 February, affecting the Mission's monitoring and verification ability.

10. At the same time, the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee has worked effectively to tackle the security issues in its regular meetings. Meanwhile, the Ceasefire Political Commission met on 25 January for the first time since early November 2006 and agreed to hold a special session on security problems, including those related to other armed groups, redeployments and Joint Integrated Units. This meeting was held on 5 March; however the agenda item on Joint Integrated Units has twice been postponed. Overall, there remains a need for high-level political engagement to advance the security agenda.

Political aspects

11. While political parties are beginning to focus on preparations for the midterm elections, envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to take place in 2009, development of the legislative framework and other prerequisites for the vote are well behind schedule. The National Constitutional Review Commission is now preparing for consultations on a draft elections law. Planning for the national census, which will determine the drawing of constituency boundaries, remains mired in budget difficulties. The pilot census project is now due to be completed by the end of April.

12. The most important piece of legislation passed during the reporting period was the Political Parties Act, which regulates the registration, operations and dissolution of political parties. The National Constitutional Review Commission held wide-ranging consultations with opposition parties and civil society, but the opposition National Democratic Alliance walked out of final discussion in protest of a clause allowing for the dissolution of political parties. The National Congress Party then introduced an amendment adding further requirements for party registration, and the bill was passed in the absence of the National Democratic Alliance. Opposition parties continued to voice concerns about the commitment of both Comprehensive Peace Agreement partners to a free and fair environment for elections.

13. The period under review witnessed some progress in the establishment of other CPA institutions. The National Civil Service Act and the National Civil Service Commission Act were enacted, and members of the Commission for the Protection of the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital were appointed by presidential decree. At the same time, some key CPA-related legislation has yet to be put before the legislature, in particular the new National Security Act and the National Police Act. Meanwhile, the technical border committee expects to present its final report to the Presidency by October.

14. Meanwhile, the parties continue to reiterate their commitment to their partnership. On 25 March, the National Congress Party/SPLM Joint High Political Committee established a subcommittee to prepare a strategy for their partnership and to tackle contentious issues including Abyei, the performance of certain Comprehensive Peace Agreement commissions and the integration of other armed groups. Meanwhile, the SPLM Interim National Council met in Yei from 8 to 12 February, for the first time since the death of First Vice-President John Garang, in July 2005, and reasserted its commitment to make unity attractive. SPLM also decided to relocate its national headquarters from Juba to Khartoum, as part of a plan to revitalize its national and international network of offices.

15. At the Government of Southern Sudan level, President Salva Kiir continued to appoint and reassign personnel in the Government of Southern Sudan and southern state governments, which are now established but facing serious capacity constraints. A lack of qualified personnel continues to hinder the development of the judiciary in particular.

16. President Kiir also launched a major anti-corruption campaign. A number of senior officials, including the Minister of Finance, were relieved of their posts to answer charges of embezzlement and bribery, including the alleged embezzlement of $60 million transferred to the SPLM by the National Congress Party shortly after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

17. In both Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, newly established government structures gained some traction. Southern Kordofan State appointed a new constitutional Government on 27 February, replacing a caretaker administration. The terms of the incumbent governors in both States are likely to be extended until 1 July. While the two states have recently made some gains in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, SPLM-controlled areas within them remain administratively separate, with their own educational and police systems, in contravention of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

18. In Abyei, the absence of a civilian administration continued to complicate the search for durable peace. The Abyei Development Committee, a civil society group, which took control of a former civilian administration office on 14 January, continued its ad hoc operations despite its lack of legal status. The visit of President Omer al-Bashir to Southern Kordofan State and to Misseriya areas of sector 6 in early March and to Blue Nile State later in the month raised hopes of progress in developing those marginalized regions.

Wealth-sharing aspects

19. At the second Sudan Consortium meeting, held from 19 to 21 March, both the Government of Southern Sudan and the Government of National Unity gave an optimistic account of progress achieved in implementing the wealth-sharing provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In reality, however, there has been little movement since the previous reporting period. While the joint technical committee on oil meets regularly to calculate oil revenues and shares, the lack of transparency continues to create mistrust, with both the Government of Southern Sudan and oil-producing states maintaining that they are not receiving their full entitlements. Meanwhile the National Petroleum Commission has not met in full session since 2005. Concerns remain about the severe impact of oil exploration on the population, including environmental degradation and lack of compensation for the displaced.

20. The Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission also continued to face challenges in fulfilling its mandate to ensure the prompt and transparent allocation and transfer of funds to the lower levels of Government. Without strong political support, the Commission has found it difficult to generate change in the existing mechanisms for allocating resources, including the states' support fund, which should have been dissolved after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

III. Implementation of other peace processes in the Sudan

21. Implementation of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, signed in October 2006, has stagnated, owing largely to internal power struggles within the leadership of the Eastern Front. A split among Beja factions of the Front prevented it from presenting a list of nominees for the posts allocated to it under the Agreement. The Eastern Front leadership has now requested mediation by the Government of Eritrea to help resolve the abiding conflict among the Beja factions. For its part, the Sudanese Government continued to express optimism about the implementation of the Agreement and has begun preparations for the disarmament and integration of former Eastern Front combatants.

22. Peace talks between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army remained suspended, with the latter rejecting the mediation of the Government of Southern Sudan and saying it did not feel secure enough to resume talks in Juba. Meanwhile, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the two sides expired on 28 February. My Special Envoy for the LRA-affected Areas, Joaquim Chissano, played an active role in the efforts aimed at restarting the talks, meeting with key stakeholders during his visit to the region in February and March. Talks are now expected to resume in April with an expanded mediation team, including observers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania.

23. In January UNMIS began transferring personnel and equipment to the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) under the "light support package" of assistance. As at 10 April, 37 military staff officers had been deployed (of 105 foreseen in the Agreement), as had 32 police advisers (of 33) and 23 civilian staff (of 48 projected). With the exception of medical and public information equipment and armoured personnel carriers, the logistical and material support provided for in the package was handed over on 11 January. The deployment of an additional 19 military and 19 civilian personnel who have been identified and recruited is pending the construction of office facilities and living accommodations that are compliant with United Nations safety and security standards in Darfur. This is a very serious issue, which UNMIS is currently attempting to address. There is also an outstanding requirement for contributions from Member States of 44 staff officers and 36 armoured personnel carriers. The tripartite committee continued to meet to facilitate the implementation of the package. The major barrier to the full implementation of the light support package, however, remains the lack of security in the face of inadequate infrastructure in Darfur.

24. The African Union and the United Nations completed consultations on the "heavy support package" of assistance on 21 January, and a joint report was transmitted to the Government of the Sudan on 24 January. The response on 6 March from President Al-Bashir challenged key provisions of the heavy support package. Details regarding the package, as agreed upon by the African Union and the United Nations, were communicated to the Government of the Sudan by the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission in identical letters addressed to President Al-Bashir on 24 January. In his response, dated 6 March, President Al-Bashir accepted some aspects of the package and expressed reservations with regard to others, in particular as they related to the Darfur Peace Agreement, and he proposed further discussions to address them. As agreed during the mini-summit on Darfur held in Riyadh on 28 March, a technical

consultative briefing was held by the United Nations and the African Union with the Government of the Sudan in Addis Ababa on 9 April in order to reiterate the rationale behind joint African Union/United Nations plans with regard to command and control, force generation, funding and other contentious issues and to finalize agreement on the heavy support package. The agreement on the heavy support package for AMIS was finalized at the meeting, with the exception of tactical/armed helicopters. Subsequent to a 12 April Security Council briefing on the outcome of the Addis Ababa meeting, the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations, in a note verbale to the Secretary-General dated 16 April, confirmed the Government's approval of the helicopter component of the heavy support package. Following Security Council authorization of the deployment of the heavy support package, appropriate steps will be taken to seek the commitment authority required to cover its cost, which is estimated to be $287.9 million.

25. With regard to the African Union/United Nations hybrid operation, the agreed terms of reference for the joint special representative and a framework containing agreed principles for taking forward the preparations for the hybrid operation were communicated to President Al-Bashir in identical letters sent by the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union on 6 March. From 19 to 26 March, in Addis Ababa, African Union and United Nations multidisciplinary teams conducted joint planning for the hybrid operation in Darfur. The draft report is being reviewed by the United Nations Secretariat and the African Union Commission with a view to its being shared with the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council respectively.

IV. Implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan

Political support and reconciliation

26. Both at the level of the central Government and in the regions, UNMIS continued to provide good offices and mediation in support of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In Abyei, Mission staff worked actively and in close collaboration with local authorities and Misseriya community leaders to defuse persistent tension. In Malakal, UNMIS continued to engage all parties in support of the peaceful relocation of SAF and aligned groups from Phom al-Zeraf. Meanwhile, in Southern Kordofan, UNMIS, together with other United Nations agencies, actively supported local authorities in their efforts to reduce tension after clashes between local police and student demonstrators in Kadugli in February.

27. In Southern Sudan, UNMIS continued its work in support of efforts by local authorities to promote peace and reconciliation. In February, the Southern Sudan Peace Commission held a conference of governors and commissioners in Torit, Greater Equatoria, which was the first major region-wide peace conference. This event, held in collaboration with Pact Sudan, an international non-governmental organization, and in consultation with UNMIS, brought to light a number of local government concerns with the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and laid important groundwork for further peace and reconciliation initiatives.

28. Simultaneously, UNMIS stepped up its engagement in efforts to reinvigorate the political process in Darfur in line with decisions taken at high-level consultations on Darfur held in Addis Ababa on 16 November 2006 and later confirmed by both the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. My Special Envoy for Darfur, Jan Eliasson, and the African Union Special Envoy, Salim Ahmed Salim, conducted two joint missions to the Sudan, meeting with all major stakeholders from the Government, opposition parties and rebel groups. Based on their contacts with key stakeholders, the Special Envoys are now developing a road map for the peace process in order to address the outstanding concerns raised by the non-signatories. UNMIS provided significant logistical and substantive support to the Envoys, as well as dedicated staff to the Joint Mediation Support Team.

Military deployment and activities

29. During the period under review, the UNMIS military component intensified its monitoring and verification activities in support of the ongoing redeployment process. In March the Mission's Force Commander convened special sessions of the Ceasefire Joint Military Commission to address discrepancies in data provided by the parties on the formation of Joint Integrated Units and the alignment of other armed groups. UNMIS military personnel subsequently undertook an intensive verification of the composition and strength of the Joint Integrated Units.

30. As SAF forces continued to withdraw from Upper Nile State, UNMIS military personnel also played a significant role in fostering dialogue between military commanders and supervising confidence-building measures, particularly in Phom al-Zeraf. Tension in the area had eased noticeably by the end of the reporting period, following the successful redeployment of SAF forces and the incorporation of erstwhile other armed groups into the Joint Integrated Unit in Malakal.

31. The military component of UNMIS was active in undertaking civil-military cooperation tasks in local communities, including the provision of medical staff to clinics, the construction and grading of roads and the clearance of unexploded ordnance across all sectors. In a tragic incident on 26 January (see para. 3 above), an Indian peacekeeper was killed in a roadside ambush by unidentified attackers while providing protection to civilian demining contractors. While it appears that there is no regular threat in the area, the United Nations troops with armoured personnel carriers have since been redeployed to the area in order to increase security during demining operations.

32. Further progress was also made towards establishing new team sites in areas where a greater UNMIS presence is required. In this connection, suitable land was identified at Raga (Western Bahr Al Ghazal) and Baw (Blue Nile), and planning is under way to convert temporary team sites at Talodi and Jullud (Southern Kordofan) into permanent sites. Land has also been acquired in Al Fasher to accommodate staff officers associated with the light support package.

33. As at 10 April, 96.4 per cent of mandated UNMIS military personnel (9,363 out of a total of 9,706) had been deployed, including 595 United Nations military observers, 253 staff officers and 8,515 troops, in addition to 63 staff officers designated for deployment to AMIS under the light support package.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

34. UNMIS, together with other United Nations agencies, continued to support the preregistration of 60,000 SAF soldiers nominated for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in both the north and the south. Meanwhile, SPLA has identified 30,700 "non-essential" combatants to be preregistered for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. UNMIS and its partners are already providing technical support to the northern and southern commissions responsible for planning disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes. However, the wider process remains hampered by a lack of meaningful engagement on the part of the parties in the principal disarmament, demobilization and reintegration mechanisms established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

35. Coordination between the southern and northern disarmament, demobilization and reintegration commissions and the provision of direction to those bodies remain a major obstacle. The National Council for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination, which is responsible for oversight, coordination and evaluation of the progress of the two commissions, had only its second meeting in March 2007, and it has made limited progress on strategic planning issues. This delay has hampered the functioning of the commissions, which, despite support from UNMIS and other international partners, have yet to clarify the eligibility criteria and entitlements for the target groups.

36. Those factors have contributed to a disconnect in planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the process of SPLA transformation, as well as to problems with the demobilization of SAF-related militias in the south. More support, including international engagement with the National Council, will be required for the commissions to effectively implement their mandate.

37. Meanwhile, UNMIS has continued to provide assistance to the national and Southern Sudanese authorities on community security and arms control, including civilian disarmament efforts in Pibor County (Jonglei). Those issues pose challenges different from those of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and need additional attention, including an integrated approach by which UNMIS, United Nations partners and local authorities can jointly tackle the intersection between arms control and livelihood issues.

Electoral assistance

38. In late January, the National Constitutional Review Commission confirmed its willingness to engage in a broad consultative process and established two subcommittees to liaise with political parties and other actors at the state level, while a third committee was recently formed to consider submissions from all stakeholders prior to preparing a draft election law. The Commission and the Presidency confirmed that the election bill would be submitted to the National Assembly in 2007, during either the April or October sessions.

39. The Mission continued to actively track legislative developments. Through various workshops, including on women's participation in elections, the Mission's election task force advocated for a fair and enabling environment for the electoral process. UNMIS also supported efforts aimed at legislative reform to promote an appropriate setting for the elections through regular meetings with the Secretary-General of the National Constitutional Review Commission and interaction with the

chairpersons of the specialized committees of the Commission. It also provided an integrated approach and represented the Mission in external mechanisms such as the monthly election donor group meetings and informal parliamentary working group meetings.

Police

40. As at 10 April, UNMIS had deployed its 653 police officers, representing 91 per cent of the Mission's authorized strength.

41. In an attempt to address the pressing need for policing in camps for internally displaced persons, particularly with regard to crimes against women and children, UNMIS initiated a community policing programme, together with Government police at camps for internally displaced persons in Khartoum, Kauda (Southern Kordofan) and Kurmuk (Blue Nile). Training and workshops associated with this project began in March. Meanwhile, UNMIS also established special investigation units in its sector offices in Juba, Wau and Malakal to focus on improving conditions and reviewing the justification for the detention of prisoners in coordination with the Government of Southern Sudan.

42. UNMIS police consolidated and expanded its programme of co-location with the National Police and the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS). The Mission assisted the two services in developing and seeking funding for approved training plans. In Southern Sudan, UNMIS continued the major undertaking of registering SSPS officers, with some 10,464 registered to date. UNMIS also assisted SSPS in identifying an organizational structure and supported the development of a draft Southern Sudan Police Service bill. The training programme and curriculum have been finalized with the leadership of SSPS. Recognizing the need to develop SSPS credibility as an alternative to the military in maintaining law and order, the Government of Southern Sudan Interior Ministry has also requested training in crowd control and maintenance of public order.

Human rights

43. In the area of human rights, the Mission continued its monitoring and capacity-building activities. In particular, with regard to the establishment of a national human rights institution, UNMIS supported broad-based discussions of the draft National Human Rights Commission act, including through a workshop for parliamentarians held on 20 January, and provided technical experts to the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission as it prepared its enabling legislation and programmes.

44. While the members of the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission have been appointed, the enabling law for the Commission has not been finalized. The Government of Southern Sudan needs to enact this important law, make available appropriate financial support and ensure the Commission's independence, in keeping with international standards. It will be important for United Nations agencies, donors and the wider international community to provide additional assistance to help implement the Commission's strategic plan.

45. UNMIS also facilitated workshops for the National Assembly's Human Rights Committee on the reform of laws concerning sexual violence and on parliamentary

cooperation with civil society, and held a series of human rights training sessions for Government police in Khartoum.

Rule of law

46. UNMIS continued to support all parties involved in the development of new legislation related to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, especially the Political Parties Act. The Mission organized workshops in Southern Sudan on the role of political parties in the electoral process and on good governance and the rule of law. In Khartoum, the Mission assisted in training organized by the Government of National Unity Ombudsman regarding administration oversight and supported workshops on juvenile justice.

47. UNMIS continued to advocate for corrections reform in the Sudan. In a welcome development, the national Interior Ministry agreed in principle to separate the prison system from the unified police force. In Southern Sudan, UNMIS completed the registration of prison staff in Central Equatoria and Lakes States and organized several training activities. The uncoordinated absorption of SPLA soldiers into the prison service remains a challenge, as do chronic gaps in capacity.

Public information

48. UNMIS radio (Radio Miraya-FM) further expanded its transmission network in an effort to transmit reliable and accessible information about the peace process to a wider audience in the Sudan. The Mission opened a new repeater station in Rumbek in January, and work is set to begin on four additional stations to enable Radio Miraya to broadcast in remote areas of Western and Eastern Equatoria States. In addition to news and Comprehensive Peace Agreement-related programming, some primary educational programmes will begin broadcasting in April. In the absence of an agreement to air in the north, Radio Miraya is negotiating with Khartoum State radio to have it carry some of its programmes.

49. The Mission continued to deliver Comprehensive Peace Agreement workshops and outreach presentations at the community and government levels and to organize visits by journalists from northern Sudan to UNMIS and United Nations agency projects in the south and in transitional areas. UNMIS also continued to cooperate closely with AMIS in the sphere of public information and deployed two public information officers to Darfur under the light support package.

Humanitarian assistance

50. By mid-March, the United Nations workplan for the Sudan, which required $1.8 billion in funding for both humanitarian and recovery assistance in 2007, was 32 per cent funded, with over $580 million pledged. Donors had also pledged some $130 million to the Common Humanitarian Fund. The first tranche of $80 million was allocated to the regions with the most critical needs; Southern Sudan received the largest amount, to support the return of refugees and displaced persons before the onset of the rainy season, followed by Darfur.

51. An outbreak of meningitis reached epidemic levels, spreading to 8 of the 10 states in Southern Sudan as well as to Abyei. Returns of internally displaced persons and refugees were put on hold in several areas, including repatriations from Uganda. A vaccination campaign is ongoing, and the epidemic is now under control. The

World Food Programme assisted 100,000 beneficiaries in Southern Sudan during the month of February. Although the annual needs and livelihoods assessment for Southern Sudan indicates that food security should improve in 2007, the United Nations estimates that 108,000 tons of food aid will still be required by 1.3 million people in the year, 60 per cent of which will be required by the chronically food-insecure households during the April to July "hunger season".

52. The humanitarian situation in Darfur has suffered from persistent violence and overall insecurity. Over 2 million people are now internally displaced, and their numbers continue to rise, while 1.9 million conflict-affected residents remain largely dependent on external aid. Approximately 107,000 civilians were newly displaced by insecurity and fighting between 1 January and 1 April. At the same time, humanitarian access in Darfur continues to be curtailed by a mixture of insecurity, targeted attacks on humanitarian workers and their assets and bureaucratic impediments. On 28 March the Government signed a joint communiqué with the United Nations, which represents a recommitment to the moratorium on restrictions for humanitarian access that entered into force in 2004. It is hoped that this will address the increasing bureaucratic delays experienced by non-governmental organizations working in Darfur. The communiqué also established a high-level committee to ensure proper implementation of the agreement.

53. In recognition of the serious humanitarian challenges in the Sudan, the recently appointed Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes, visited the country from 20 to 27 March, travelling to Khartoum, Juba and Government- and rebel-held areas in Darfur, and meeting with Government of National Unity and Government of Southern Sudan officials, humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations, affected populations and tribal leaders.

Protection of civilians

54. In recent months, some progress has been made with regard to the protection of civilians in Southern Sudan, including in Phom al-Zeraf, Tonga, Kaldak and surrounding areas prior to and following the SAF redeployment. However, conflict over land and cattle continues to generate serious protection challenges. UNMIS has verified reports of Murle raids in Jonglei State in which over 150 children were reported to have been abducted since January. During her visit to the Sudan in early February, my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, urged all parties to release children associated with armed groups.

55. UNMIS also identified protection concerns arising from the use of SPLA forces to enforce law and order. The normalization of civilian life and the strengthening of civilian authority were further complicated by insecurity associated with LRA in Equatoria.

Returns

56. The strong cooperation established between the Government of National Unity, the Government of Southern Sudan and United Nations agencies began to bear fruit, with the first organized returns of internally displaced persons from Khartoum to Southern Kordofan and Southern Sudan. By mid-April some 20,000 internally displaced persons had been assisted to return to their places of origin in five separate operations, and 25,000 refugees returned home from five neighbouring

countries. While those movements started later than anticipated, they proceeded relatively smoothly. However, the total number of assisted returns are to date short of the target, owing partly to delays in establishing departure facilities in Khartoum, less than expected participation among registered internally displaced persons and delayed financing by the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan.

57. The United Nations continued to monitor the living conditions of internally displaced persons in Khartoum through community-based mechanisms, assessments and dialogue with the relevant authorities. In Darfur, the current situation is not conducive to facilitated returns.

Mine action

58. UNMIS mine action teams have made considerable progress during the current dry season. To date, over 10 million square metres of suspected dangerous areas have been demined, and some 2,700 anti-personnel mines, 1,100 anti-tank mines and 590,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance and small arms ammunition have been cleared. UNMIS and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) have provided mine-risk education to over 1 million people in affected areas, as well as in camps and way stations for internally displaced persons, in an attempt to sensitize those returning to the risk of mines and unexploded ordnance. Over 1,300 kilometres of roads have been verified or cleared for emergency deployment and aid delivery, including several return routes.

59. In coordination with UNMIS mine action activities, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) trained five joint integrated demining unit teams, thus achieving the first benchmark for local mine action capacity development in the Sudan.

Recovery and reconstruction

60. The second meeting of the Sudan Consortium was held from 19 to 21 March in Khartoum and Juba. Donors made it clear that they would not be able to continue to finance recovery and development efforts in the north unless there was progress in Darfur, which would have direct implications for support for the "three areas" (Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile). It was recognized at the Sudan Consortium that the Government of Southern Sudan had made significant progress in 2006 in terms of the establishment of institutions at all levels, evidence of more active accountability and expanded capacity-building efforts. However, priorities will need to focus on building public institutions for good governance and establishing basic infrastructure links, enabling productive activities and delivering basic services. Donors also called for a review of aid mechanisms, including the establishment of new priorities and costing for the second phase of the original joint assessment mission.

61. Positive preliminary discussions were held with both the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan on the establishment of "second windows" to the funds administered by UNDP, intended to speed up the disbursement and implementation of early recovery and reintegration initiatives through the multi-donor trust funds.

Gender

62. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and relevant provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, UNMIS provided technical support and capacity-building to the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan ministries responsible for integrating gender perspectives into key legislation. In Khartoum, the Ministry of Social Welfare has submitted for adoption its final draft national gender policy to the Government. UNMIS also continued to support women's organizations seeking to achieve a 30 per cent target for women's representation in the Government of National Unity and a 25 per cent target in the Government of Southern Sudan. Within the Mission, UNMIS promoted gender mainstreaming through training for all staff and the establishment of a system of gender focal points in various Mission components.

HIV/AIDS

63. UNMIS continued to deliver peer HIV/AIDS training, graduating 104 new educators during the period under review, bringing the total to 359. Peer educator training targeted military, youth and women's associations, and the new batch of graduates will support SPLA and the Southern Sudan disarmament, demobilization and reintegration commission. HIV/AIDS sensitization among UNMIS peacekeepers was maintained at 90 per cent. In addition, UNDP, together with other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, continued its efforts to address the HIV/AIDS problem, mainly as part of the Global Fund initiative.

Conduct and discipline

64. Since my previous report, 22 allegations of misconduct have been reported, including two serious cases, which were referred to the Office of Internal Oversight Services for investigation.

65. Following international media reports of alleged sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations peacekeepers in Juba, UNMIS leadership re-energized the Mission's effort to enforce the United Nations zero-tolerance policy. In January and February, two workshops were organized with Government and civil society representatives in Khartoum and Juba to explain the prevention and reporting mechanisms as well as the disciplinary action that would be taken against personnel found guilty of misconduct. In the meantime, a task force was established under the National Council for Child Welfare (Khartoum) with UNMIS, UNICEF and other national actors, which will undertake joint preventive and outreach activities. A similar body will be established in Juba with the Government of Southern Sudan.

Mission decentralization

66. As anticipated in the last report, in order to increase the effectiveness of the Mission's operations in Southern Sudan, UNMIS is moving forward with a phased programme of regionalization focusing on a further strengthening of its regional office in Juba. The aim of this process is to enable the office to deliver increased and more efficient support, services and programmes in Southern Sudan and to facilitate local decision-making. The need for this decentralization programme arises first from a series of logistical, administrative and operational challenges faced during the deployment phase in Southern Sudan and second from a growing need for closer daily interaction with the Government of Southern Sudan.

67. The delegation of substantial managerial, administrative and financial authority to the Juba office is well under way. The Mission has created a new post of head of sector 1 (Juba), within existing resources, to enable the Regional Coordinator to coordinate all Mission activities in Southern Sudan, focus on regional issues, represent the Head of Mission on a day-to-day basis with the Government of Southern Sudan and facilitate substantive and managerial oversight of sectors 1, 2 and 3. The Deputy Director of Administration has been relocated to Juba to head a strengthened support component, ensuring that sector offices 1, 2 and 3 are supported directly from the regional office in Juba. Over the next few months, the Mission will expand its office and living accommodation in Juba to cater to the additional staff being assigned there. Similarly, the Mission will continue the process of decentralization throughout its area of responsibility by delegating authority to transitional areas in sectors 4 (Kadugli), 5 (Blue Nile) and 6 (Abyei), as well as to the Darfur office. In Darfur in particular, decentralization will facilitate the deployment of the support packages to AMIS and help prepare the ground for the future deployment of the hybrid mission.

Civilian staffing

68. UNMIS has now substantially overcome its initial difficulty in recruiting and retaining well-qualified personnel. Civilian staff strength rose from 796 to 918 international staff (of a projected total of 1,139 posts), from 2,265 to 2,416 national staff (of a total of 3,342 posts) and 172 to 190 United Nations Volunteers (of a total of 231 posts).

V. Impediments in mandate implementation

69. The challenges described in my previous report persist, with the activities of the Mission hampered by both security constraints and logistical and bureaucratic impediments. The security environment in the Sudan continues to be very complicated, volatile and dependent on a variety of medium- to high-risk internal and external factors. In recent months, the Mission worked hard to enhance the security of its staff and installations through a range of additional and sustainable protective security measures. In Darfur, insecurity remains the major factor limiting the expansion of United Nations operations and support for AMIS. The ceasefire remains tenuous, and armed attacks and looting are on the increase.

70. On 19 January personnel from the United Nations, AMIS and international non-governmental organizations were arrested and detained by national security and local police while attending a gathering at a non-governmental organization guesthouse in Nyala (South Darfur). During the arrest and detention, several individuals, including five United Nations staff members, were physically assaulted with batons and rifles, and a female staff member was subjected to sexual harassment. Upon their release, criminal proceedings were initiated against the United Nations personnel but were later suspended pending review by the Government of National Unity Ministry of Justice. The United Nations has initiated its own board of inquiry to investigate the incident. While the Government had committed itself to cooperating with the United Nations in the investigation, no information has thus far been shared.

71. In the meantime, UNMIS and several agencies continued to face serious obstacles to their operations in Darfur, mainly in North Darfur, where personnel were regularly stopped when travelling, in contravention of the status-of-forces agreement.

72. UNMIS remains very concerned about breaches of the Government's commitments under the status-of-forces agreement. The reporting period saw an increase in interference with United Nations flight operations and customs clearance throughout the Sudan. In high-level meetings, the Government has pledged to address these recurring problems; however, there has not yet been any discernible change.

VI. Financial implications

73. The General Assembly, by its resolution 60/122 B, appropriated the amount of $1,079,534,400, equivalent to $89,961,200 per month, for UNMIS for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNMIS beyond 30 April 2007, the cost of maintaining the Mission until 30 June 2007 would be limited to the amounts approved by the Assembly.

74. As at 31 December 2006, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNMIS amounted to $283 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $1.76 million.

75. Troop costs and contingent-owned equipment costs have been reimbursed for the period ending 31 January 2007 and 31 December 2006 respectively.

VII. Observations

76. As the members of the Security Council will recall, my previous report indicated that the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was about to enter a critical phase. The two parties have weathered the first third of the interim period and have continued to make progress against considerable odds, including the untimely death of one of the Agreement's supreme architects, John Garang, continued mistrust and a still considerable number of spoilers. In addition, the ongoing conflict in Darfur remains a source of disagreement between the parties and has diverted the attention of the international community.

77. The implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement has reached a delicate stage, at which either the point of departure or the destination could easily be lost. However, two critical reference points bind this middle phase of the interim period, namely, the full and verified redeployment of forces in 2007 and the holding of free and fair midterm elections in 2009. Everything in reason should be done to successfully reach these important markers, which will help the parties to consolidate the gains made thus far and to embark on the final stretch of the peace process.

78. Until now, UNMIS has focused much of its attention and resources on assisting the parties to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as well as on monitoring and observing the ceasefire, with measurable results. Although the parties have yet to agree on a shared strategic approach to security, including the

development of Joint Integrated Units, they have so far acted to manage and de-escalate tensions on the ground. This process of cooperation and problem-solving will need to intensify as the two armed forces approach the larger strategic challenge of complete redeployment.

79. The completion of this vital redeployment process is likely to present several serious challenges in the months ahead. First, the parties must remain firmly committed to the details of the redeployment plans and accept the reality and far-reaching implications of their implementation. This process will require serious political engagement by both parties. Once completed, however, the redeployment will signify a historic end to a three-decade-old pattern of gross military interference and devastating hostilities.

80. With the assistance of the United Nations, the parties must now devote considerable attention to verification of the process. If and when disagreements emerge, they will need to be handled and resolved through the pertinent institutions without jeopardizing overall progress or compromising the integrity of the process. The conclusion of redeployment, which also requires transparency and progress in the integration of other armed groups and the development of Joint Integrated Units, will embody the parties' rejection of a military solution to the conflict that has divided them.

81. Fundamental to meeting all of these challenges is the parties' recognition that the destructive stalemate, which finally led to the momentous compromises reached in Naivasha, Kenya, two and half years ago, remains a lose-lose scenario. The full and irreversible implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is the only viable strategy for the Sudan and its peoples.

82. While the main responsibility for the completion of the security protocol lies with the two parties, they will require the full engagement and support of the international community. In this connection, I urge the Security Council and all concerned Member States to help the Sudanese honour their commitments under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Financial and other assistance from donors will be especially needed in the areas of Joint Integrated Unit development, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programming and community security, based on meaningful security sector reform.

83. The second marker in this phase of the interim period — the preparation for and holding of democratic midterm elections in 2009 — will require equal determination. The elections will be a crucial affirmation of the Naivasha promise to make the Comprehensive Peace Agreement an inclusive process, based on the will of the Sudanese people. The immediate focus of this endeavour should be on the long-overdue enactment of the elections law, to be followed by the prompt establishment of an independent National Election Commission. It is imperative that the National Constitutional Review Commission continue to drive the drafting process for those bills, based on broad and inclusive consultations. Other important prerequisites to effective planning and preparation for elections are an agreement on the boundaries of Abyei and the 1 January 1956 border, the organization of a census and the repatriation of displaced persons.

84. It is equally important to recognize that free and fair elections do not begin at the ballot box; the time has come for tangible progress to be made on lifting restrictions on political opposition and civil society and in bringing the police and

security services in line with the requirements of the Interim National Constitution. In this connection, I regret that the National Human Rights Commission has not yet been established. I urge the Government to do this quickly and in full compliance with the Paris Principles relating to the status of national institutions, as endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 48/134. In particular, I recommend that the composition of the Commission ensure the pluralistic representation of all social forces in civil society that contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights.

85. Support for the electoral process will also require a nimble adjustment of United Nations and international resources, allowing for the rapid build-up of technical assistance and monitoring capacity, as well as intensive engagement with civil society and political actors. In addition to the Government of the Sudan, I urge donors to plan now for the contributions they can make, including for the strengthening of the capacity of political parties, the media and civil society organizations, all of which have important roles to play in the process.

86. In preparing for the elections, the parties must also pay very close attention to the situations in Southern Kordofan, Abyei and Blue Nile and reach understanding on all outstanding issues related to those regions. I trust that the international community will lend its support to such efforts, mindful of the need for the eventual referendum for Abyei and the "popular consultation" for the other two areas, in accordance with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

87. Finally, I urge the Sudanese people, and particularly their leaders, to recognize that ultimately, peace in their country is indivisible. Without a resolution to the tragic and devastating conflict in Darfur, continued progress in and eventually a successful conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement will be hard to achieve. While troop redeployments can proceed without immediate impact on the situation in Darfur, the same is not true for the country-wide preparations necessary for successful midterm elections in 2009. Peace and stability throughout the country remain a fundamental requirement for elections. As the Security Council considers the future of the Sudan, I urge members to pursue an integrated approach in which an international strategy for peace in Darfur is reinforcing the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The paramount goal for international complementary efforts in the areas of security, political and humanitarian assistance must be to stabilize Darfur sufficiently so that its residents are able to participate in the 2009 midterm elections along with the rest of the country.

88. Peace in the Sudan will also require sustained attention to post-conflict recovery and development. Again, there can be little progress in the north, including the three areas, without an improvement in the situation in Darfur. In addition to supporting peace throughout the Sudan, donors will need to continue to meet the pledges they made at Oslo and prepare for additional commitments in 2008 and beyond to support the second phase of the joint assessment mission. Seeing those commitments through will be critical to realizing the joint pledge made at the meeting of the Sudan Consortium to make 2007 the year for the delivery of peace dividends.

89. For its part, the United Nations will do its utmost to contribute to the cause of peace throughout the Sudan, including through its full support to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Darfur Peace Agreement and other

major decisions. In this connection, I would like to recommend that the mandate of UNMIS be extended for six months, until 31 October 2007.

90. In conclusion, I wish to express my gratitude to all United Nations personnel working in the Sudan for their determined effort to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to end the conflict in Darfur. I am also very appreciative of the efforts of the African Union — with whom the United Nations is cooperating very closely — as well as the invaluable assistance provided by Member States, including donors and troop- and police-contributing countries.

Annex

Military and police component as at 10 April 2007

	Military component									
	Observers		*Staff officers*		*Troops*		*Military subtotal*		*Civilian police*	
Country	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*
Argentina	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	—
Australia	5	1	5	4	—	—	10	5	9	1
Bangladesh	20	—	31	—	1 503	—	1 554	—	27	—
Belgium	5	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—
Benin	7	—	—	—	—	—	7	—	—	—
Bolivia	15	—	1	—	—	—	16	—	—	—
Bosnia and Herzegovina	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
Botswana	5	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—
Brazil	24	—	—	—	—	—	24	—	3	—
Cambodia	10	—	1	—	134	—	145	—	—	—
Canada	23	—	7	—	—	—	30	1	1	1
China	14	—	11	—	424	11	449	11	7	2
Croatia	—	—	5	—	—	—	5	—	—	—
Denmark	10	—	6	—	—	—	16	—	2	—
Ecuador	20	—	—	—	—	—	20	—	—	—
Egypt	20	—	21	—	781	15	822	15	2	—
El Savador	5	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	4	2
Fiji	7	—	—	—	—	—	7	—	4	3
Finland	—	—	2	—	—	—	2	—	2	—
Gabon	6	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—
Gambia	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	4	—
Germany	33	—	5	—	—	—	38	—	5	—
Ghana	—	—	3	—	—	—	3	—	35	3
Greece	4	—	2	—	—	—	6	—	—	—
Guatemala	8	—	1	—	—	—	9	—	—	—
Guinea	10	—	—	—	—	—	10	—	—	—
India	20	—	27	—	2 577	4	2 624	4	20	2
Indonesia	10	—	—	—	—	—	10	—	—	—
Jamaica	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	2
Jordan	12	—	9	—	—	—	21	—	23	2
Kenya	6	1	10	—	776	32	795	33	18	2
Kyrgyzstan	5	3	—	—	—	—	5	3	2	—
Malawi	6	—	1	—	—	—	7	—	—	—
Malaysia	8	—	3	—	—	—	11	—	11	—
Mali	9	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	—	—
Moldova	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
Mongolia	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
Mozambique	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—
Namibia	9	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	1	—
Nepal	6	2	6	—	—	—	12	2	55	2
Netherlands	14	—	3	—	—	—	17	—	14	1

	Military component									
	Observers		*Staff officers*		*Troops*		*Military subtotal*		*Civilian police*	
Country	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*
New Zealand	2	—	1	—	—	—	3	—	—	—
Nigeria	10	—	5	1	—	—	15	1	29	2
Norway	16	—	11	—	—	—	27	—	4	—
Pakistan	20	—	26	—	1 538	—	1 584	—	36	2
Paraguay	10	—	—	—	—	—	10	—	—	—
Peru	17	—	—	—	—	—	17	—	—	—
Philippines	13	—	—	—	—	—	13	—	52	—
Poland	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
Republic of Korea	7	—	1	—	—	—	8	—	—	—
Romania	12	—	—	—	—	—	12	—	—	—
Russian Federation	15	—	3	—	120	—	138	—	11	—
Rwanda	15	—	8	—	254	—	277	—	24	—
Samoa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	16	—
South Africa	—	—	4	—	—	—	4	—	—	—
Sri Lanka	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	22	1
Sweden	3	—	1	—	—	—	4	—	13	2
Thailand	12	—	1	—	—	—	13	—	—	—
Turkey	—	—	4	—	—	—	4	—	27	—
Uganda	9	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	17	3
Ukraine	4	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	23	—
United Kingdom	—	—	4	—	—	—	4	—	2	—
United Republic of Tanzania	15	—	2	—	—	—	17	—	2	—
United States	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	2
Uruguay	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
Vanuatu	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
Yemen	16	—	3	—	—	—	19	—	3	—
Zambia	10	2	11	—	306	39	327	41	21	1
Zimbabwe	12	2	2	—	—	—	14	2	22	11
Total per gender	**584**	**11**	**248**	**5**	**8 414**	**101**	**9 246**	**117**	**606**	**47**
Total	**595**		**253**		**8 515**		**9 363**		**653**	



Map No. 4249 Rev. 7 UNITED NATIONS
April 2007

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

United Nations A/61/862–S/2007/214

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
17 April 2007

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-first session
Agenda item 19
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-second year

Letter dated 13 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and further to the letter dated 14 February 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to you (A/61/746-S/2007/89), I have the honour to draw your attention to new violations of international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by military aircraft of the Turkish air force, recorded from 1 February to 29 March 2007.

On 1 February 2007, two Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 6 and 7 February 2007, one Cougar, two C-130 and two CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations six times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus six times.

On 8 February 2007, two CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus once.

On 12 February 2007, two CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On the same day, two Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 13 February 2007, two Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 14 February 2007, three Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

07-30998 (E) 190407

On 15 February 2007, two Cougar and one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 19 February 2007, one Cougar, one CN-235 and one B-200 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations five times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus five times.

On 20 and 21 February 2007, four Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 22 February 2007, two Cougar and two CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 23 February 2007, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 1 March 2007, two Cougar and one AB-205 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 2 and 3 March 2007, two Cougar and two AB-205 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 4 March 2007, one Cougar and one AB-205 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 7 March 2007, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 8 March 2007, two Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 12 March 2007, one Cougar and two C-160 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 15 March 2007, one C-160 and two Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 16 March 2007, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 19 March 2007, two Cougar and two B-200 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 20 March 2007, two Cougar and two B-200 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 March 2007, nine Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations nine times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus nine times.

On 26, 27 and 28 March 2007, three Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 27 March 2007, two Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 29 March 2007, one C-160, one CN-235 and two Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

As repeatedly indicated in our previous communications, the aforementioned violations blatantly contravene international law and air traffic regulations and seriously endanger international civil aviation.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, I strongly protest the above violations and call for their immediate cessation. The Government of Turkey should respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and contribute to the creation of the required conditions for the achievement of progress to the long-standing political problem in Cyprus.

I would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Andreas D. **Mavroyiannis**

United Nations S/2007/215

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 April 2007

Original: English

Letter dated 16 April 2007 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its nineteenth ordinary session, held in Riyadh at the summit level on 28 and 29 March 2007 (see annex). The resolution is entitled "Occupation by Iran of the three Arab Islands of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa in the Arabian Gulf, which belong to the United Arab Emirates" (resolution 376 (19) of 29 March 2007).

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the text of this letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yahya **Mahmassani**
Ambassador

07-31052 (E) 180407 190407

Annex to the letter dated 16 April 2007 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

Council of the League of Arab States at the summit level

Nineteenth ordinary session

Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

9 and 10 Rabi' I A.H. 1428, corresponding to 28 and 29 March A.D. 2007

Occupation by Iran of the three Arab Islands of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa in the Arabian Gulf, which belong to the United Arab Emirates

The Council of the League of Arab States, at the Ministerial level,

Having considered:

- The note of the General Secretariat,
- Report of the Secretary-General on joint Arab action,

Reaffirming its earlier decisions, the most recent being resolution 341 of 29 March 2006, adopted in its eighteenth regular session at the Khartoum Summit, concerning the occupation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of three Arab islands in the Arabian Gulf, namely the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, which belong to the United Arab Emirates.

Decides

1. To reaffirm without qualification the full sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over its three islands of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa and to support all peaceful measures and means adopted by the United Arab Emirates to regain its sovereignty over the occupied islands;

2. To denounce the continued confirmation by the Iranian Government of its occupation of the three islands and the violation of the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates, so as to undermine security and stability in the region and pose a threat to international peace and security;

3. To condemn the building by the Islamic Republic of Iran of housing facilities to settle Iranians on the three occupied Arab islands;

4. To condemn the Iranian military manoeuvres which include the three occupied islands of the United Arab Emirates, namely the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, and those islands' territorial waters, airspace, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, which constitute an inseparable part of the United Arab Emirates; and to request that Iran desist from such violations and acts of provocation, which constitute interference in the internal affairs of an independent, sovereign State, are not conducive to confidence-building, threaten security and stability in the region and endanger the security and safety of regional and international navigation in the Arabian Gulf;

5. To appeal once again to the Iranian Government to end its occupation of the three islands of the United Arab Emirates, refrain from trying to impose a fait accompli by force, desist from establishing any installations there for the purpose of modifying the islands' demographic structure, and revoke all measures and remove all installations unilaterally executed by Iran on the three Arab islands, inasmuch as such measures and claims are null and void, lack any legal effect, do not detract from the established right of the United Arab Emirates over its three islands and are acts that run counter to the provisions of international law and the Geneva Conventions of 1949; and to call upon the Iranian Government to adopt peaceful means for resolving the existing dispute over them in accordance with the principles and norms of international law, including agreement to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice;

6. To express the hope that the Islamic Republic of Iran will reconsider its position of rejecting the effort to find a peaceful solution to the issue of the three occupied islands of the United Arab Emirates either through direct, earnest negotiations or through recourse to the International Court of Justice;

7. To call upon Iran to translate its stated desire for improved relations with the Arab countries and for dialogue and détente into concrete, practical steps, both in word and in deed, in the form of a genuine response to the earnest appeals launched by His Highness Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, as well as the States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab States, international groups, friendly nations and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, calling for a solution to the dispute over the three occupied islands by peaceful means in accordance with customary practice, existing covenants and the rules of international law, either through direct, earnest negotiations or through recourse to the International Court of Justice, so as to build trust and enhance security and stability in the Arabian Gulf region;

8. To have all Arab States undertake, in their contacts with Iran, to raise the issue of Iran's occupation of the three islands in order to stress the need to end it, based on the fact that the three islands are occupied Arab territory;

9. To inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council of the importance of maintaining the issue on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized until Iran ends its occupation of the three Arab islands and the United Arab Emirates regains its full sovereignty over them;

10. To request the Secretary-General to follow up this matter and report to the Council at its next ordinary session.

(Resolution 376 (19) of 29 March 2007)

United Nations S/2007/216

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 April 2007

Original: English

Letter dated 17 April 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

On 9 February 2007, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1727 (2006), I took the necessary administrative measures to extend the mandate of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire and appointed the following five experts to serve on the Group:

Grégoire Bafouatika, Congo (aviation)
Lipika Majumdar Roy Choudhury, India (finance)
Abdoul Wahab Diakhaby, Guinea (diamonds)
André Thorsen, Canada (arms)
Oumar Dieye Sidi, Niger (customs)

I have subsequently been informed that one of the experts, André Thorsen, was unable to assume his functions. Taking into account the short period of time remaining in the mandate of the Group of Experts, and in consultation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004), I wish to inform you that I have decided not to appoint a new expert to replace Mr. Thorsen.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

07-31016 (E) 180407

United Nations A/61/864–S/2007/217

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
18 April 2007

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-first session
Agenda items 13 and 14

The situation in the Middle East

Question of Palestine

Security Council
Sixty-second year

Identical letters dated 17 April 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I write to inform you of the highly alarming number of terror attacks carried out by Palestinian terrorists operating in the Gaza Strip over the past four weeks.

From Monday, 19 March 2007, until yesterday morning, Monday, 16 April 2007, 28 rockets were fired by Palestinian terrorists in the Gaza Strip at Israeli communities in the south. These rocket attacks included the launching of Qassams and mortar shells, six of which detonated in Israeli territory. One Qassam rocket landed in the western Negev city of Sderot, causing damage and light injury to civilians. In response to the launching of 21 rockets during the week of 26 March to 2 April, Israel destroyed a number of rocket launching pads used by Palestinian terrorists.

The continuation of Palestinian terror gravely violates the agreed upon ceasefire between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas. Moreover, the relentless Palestinian terror threatens the viability of sustainable peace and security in our region. The Palestinian government, which Hamas still plays a significant role in, must adhere to the three conditions of the international community, and put an end to the violence and terror against Israel.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 13 and 14, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Daniel **Carmon**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

07-31121 (E) 190407

United Nations S/2007/218

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 April 2007

Original: English

Letter dated 19 April 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 4 April 2007, which I received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

07-31295 (E) 200407

Annex

Letter dated 4 April 2007 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

In paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996), the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was requested to submit consolidated progress reports every six months to the Security Council, commencing 11 April 1996, on the Agency's verification activities in Iraq pursuant to paragraphs 12 and 13 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and related resolutions.

Since 17 March 2003, IAEA has not been in a position to implement its mandate in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and related resolutions. Pursuant to Iraq's safeguards agreement with IAEA in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Agency performed a physical inventory verification of the nuclear materials located at Tuwaitha from 19 to 22 November 2006.

During the period covered by this report, satellite imagery of the most significant sites has continued to be systematically collected and assessed.

Training on nuclear material accountancy and control continues to be provided by the Agency to Iraq to assist in the proper operation of its States system of accounting for and control of nuclear material.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter to be distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohamed **ElBaradei**

United Nations A/61/875–S/2007/219

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
19 April 2007
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-first session
Agenda item 13
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-second year

Identical letters dated 19 April 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On the instructions of my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations between 8 and 14 April 2007 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 13, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Caroline **Ziade**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

07-31388 (E) 200407 200407

Annex to the identical letters dated 19 April 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Subject: Israeli violations, acts of aggression and activities from 8 to 14 April 2007, inclusive

Air violations

Between 1710 and 1910 hours on 8 April 2007, an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace over Rumaysh, circled over areas of the South and departed over `Alma al-Sha`b. Between 2058 and 2340 hours another reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace over the sea off Sarafand, flying as far as Beirut, circled between Sarafand and Beirut and then departed over al-Naqurah.

Between 1300 and 1335 hours on 12 April 2007, Israeli enemy warplanes flew at high altitudes over the area of Bint Jubayl.

At 1249 hours on 14 April 2007, Israeli enemy aircraft flew over Ras al-Naqurah.

Sea violations

Between 0839 and 0850 hours on 8 April 2007, an Israeli enemy military launch fired several bursts of medium machine gun fire in the open sea opposite Ras al-Naqurah.

Acts of aggression in the field

Between 1935 and 2210 hours on 11 April 2007, a searchlight was directed from the Israeli enemy's outpost at Jabal al-Tayyarat in the direction of the outskirts of the village of Yarun.

At 1055 hours on 14 April 2007, during a patrol by the Lebanese Army on the Blue Line, two Israeli soldiers aimed their weapon at the patrol at Tallat Yarun (opposite the Hadab position) and an Israeli tank aimed its gun at the patrol at Birkat Yarun.

Israeli activities

Between 2030 and 2040 hours on 11 April 2007, Israeli enemy warplanes and helicopters flew inside the occupied territories opposite the villages of Yarun, Rumaysh and `Ayta al-Sha`b as far as Ramiyah, and between 2115 and 2215 hours two helicopters flew over the outposts at al-Ramta, al-Samaqah, Ruwaysat al-`Alam and Birkat al-Naqar (inside the occupied Shab`a farmlands).

At 1030 hours on 14 April 2007 the Israeli enemy opened fire on a floating object to the south of the line of buoys in order to sink it (inside the waters of occupied Palestine).

United Nations S/2007/220

Security Council

Distr.: General
20 April 2007

Original: English

Letter dated 19 April 2007 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that the members of the Security Council have decided to send a mission on the Kosovo issue from 24 to 29 April 2007. The mission will be led by Johan C. Verbeke, Permanent Representative of Belgium. The members of the Council have agreed on the terms of reference of the mission, which are annexed hereto.

The members of the Council have agreed that the composition of the mission is as follows:

Johan C. Verbeke, Head of mission (Belgium)
Li Junhua (China)
Basile Ikouebe (Congo)
Jean-Marc de la Sablière (France)
Leslie Christian (Ghana)
Hasan Kleib (Indonesia)
Marcello Spatafora (Italy)
Ricardo Alberto Arias (Panama)
Luis Enrique Chávez (Peru)
Mutlaq Majed Al-Qahtani (Qatar)
Vitaly Churkin (Russian Federation)
Peter Burian (Slovakia)
Dumisani Kumalo (South Africa)
Karen Pierce (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
Zlmay Khalilzad (United States of America)

I should he grateful if you could have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Emyr **Jones Parry**
President of the Security Council

07-31489 (E) 200407

Annex

Security Council mission on the Kosovo issue

The year 2007 emerges as a significant one for Kosovo. In the light of the recent submission of the United Nations Special Envoy's set of proposals to the Security Council, the Council has decided to give its members the opportunity to inform themselves of the situation on the ground, by sending a Security Council mission to Belgrade and Kosovo, from 25 to 28 April 2007. The mission will also visit Brussels and Vienna. A balanced programme and comprehensive schedule of meetings will provide the Security Council members with a first-hand understanding of progress made since the Security Council adopted resolution 1244 (1999). It will allow the Security Council to have an informed understanding of the political, social and economic situation in Kosovo. Earlier Council missions took place in April 2000, June 2001 and December 2002.

The mission has the following objectives:

(a) To obtain first-hand information on progress made in Kosovo since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), including on the implementation of the agreed standards;

(b) To receive information directly from the leadership of Serbia and the Provisional Institutions for Self-Government of Kosovo and from representatives of Kosovo's ethnic minority communities on the current political, social and economic situation in Kosovo, as well as on the regional situation;

(c) To receive information directly from representatives of the international community, in Brussels and on the ground, on the current political, social and economic situation in Kosovo, as well as on the regional situation.

The mission will report its conclusions to the Security Council.

United Nations A/61/876–S/2007/221

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
23 April 2007

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-first session
Agenda items 66, 80 and 100

Security Council
Sixty-second year

Right of peoples to self-determination

The rule of law at the national and international levels

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Letter dated 20 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as Chair of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, I have the honour to enclose herewith the statement by the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement on the release of the international terrorist Luis Posada Carriles, adopted on Friday, 20 April 2007 (see annex).

Furthermore, I request that you kindly circulate the above-mentioned document as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 66, 80 and 100, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Rodrigo **Malmierca Díaz**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations
Chair of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement

07-31642 (E) 240407

Annex to the letter dated 20 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and Spanish]

Statement by the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement on the release of the international terrorist Luis Posada Carriles

The Non-Aligned Movement has received with great concern the news issued by international news agencies on the release on bail of the notorious international terrorist Luis Posada Carriles by decision of a United States Court.

As it is very well know, Mr. Posada Carriles is responsible for numerous terrorist actions against Cuba and other countries, including the terrorist attack on a Cubana de Aviación aircraft in October 1976, which caused the death to 73 innocent civilians from different countries, for which the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has requested his extradition to the Government of the United States. Despite this fact, he was been detained in United States territory under a simple accusation of an immigration violation, while the Venezuelan request has been ignored.

The Movement reaffirms its strong and unequivocal condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, as well as all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever, by whosoever, and against whomsoever committed, including those in which States are directly or indirectly involved, which are unjustifiable whatever the considerations or factors that may be invoked to justify them.

The Movement urges all States once again, consistent with the UN Charter, to fulfil their obligations under international law and international humanitarian law in the fight against terrorism, including by prosecuting or, where appropriate, extraditing the perpetrators of terrorist acts; by preventing the organization, instigation or financing of terrorist acts against other States from within or outside their territories or by organisations based in their territories; by refraining from organizing, instigating, assisting, financing or participating in terrorist acts in the territories of other States; by refraining from encouraging activities within their territories directed towards the commission of such acts; by refraining from allowing the use of their territories for planning, training or financing for such acts; or by refraining from supplying arms or other weapons that could be used for terrorist acts in other States.

The Movement demands that all States refrain from extending, political, diplomatic, moral or material support for terrorism, and in this context, urges all States, consistent with the UN Charter and in fulfilling their obligations under international law, to ensure that refugee status or any other legal status is not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation by them are not recognised as grounds for refusing requests for their extradition.

As it was agreed by the Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement at the 14th Summit Conference held in Havana on September 2006, the Movement reiterates its support for the extradition request that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela interposed to the Government of the United States to bring Mr. Luis Posada Carriles to justice.